Ethnicity and Power in the Soviet Union by Andrzej Wierzbicki  & Andrzej Wierzbicki 
Проблемы постсоветского пространства / Post-Soviet Issues
240
История и религия
2017 4(3):240-255
DOI: 10.24975/2313-8920-2017-4-3-240-255
ИСТОРИЯ И РЕЛИГИЯ
Ethnicity and Power in the Soviet Union
Andrzej Wierzbicki
Warsaw university, Warsaw, Poland, 
awierzb@onet.eu
Abstract: Twenty years have passed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Up until the point 
of dissolution, the Soviet authorities and intellectual elite had attempted to build a community in 
order to unite all Soviet citizens in the spirit of socialist modernisation. Although it is difficult to 
demonstrate that ‘a Soviet nation’ was successfully created [1], the attempt to build such a nation 
can serve as a case study through which to examine nation-building processes for constructiv-
ists as well as modernists . In addition to socialist modernisation, the Soviet nation aimed to be 
identified as a state, which would make it similar to the political nations dominant in western 
countries. Contrary to western tradition, however, it was not a nation state that provided full 
rights for all its citizens, but rather a socialist state that was ‘ruled by workers and peasantry’. 
Nevertheless, the authorities aimed to give the Soviet nation the characteristics of a specific 
nation state. “It was a nation that in historical terms strived, or more accurately part of which 
strived, to form or proclaim a particular state” [2]. While at the time of proclaiming the USSR 
there was no such thing as the Soviet nation, it can be assumed that it was intended to become 
a constructed titular nation.
The majority of national communities, even created ones, have an ethnic core. However academ-
ics cannot agree on the kind of state the USSR was, to what extent it took into account the ethnic-
ity of its multinational population, how much it reflected the values, culture, and interests of its 
largest population group (i.e., the Russians) or even whether it was a Russian national state despite 
the strong influence of Russian ideology and politics. Some Russian academics, especially those 
in nationalistic circles (e.g., Valerij Solovej) as well as western scholars such as Terry Martin and 
Geoffrey Hosking stressed that Russians dominated demographically and politically. However, 
the USSR did not aim to nurture traditional Russian values. It rather fostered the de- ethnicisation 
of Russians and the ethnicisation of non-Russian. Another group of scientists, including those 
from post-Soviet states (e.g., Žambyl Artykbaev, Otar Džanelidze, and Georgij Siamašvili) as 
well as western scholars (e.g., Rogers Brubaker) concede that positive processes such as the 
allotment of territory to republics and other territorial units, the constitution of authority and ad-
ministrative apparatus, and the formation of the elites once characterised the ethnic history of the 
USSR. All these processes, however, were dominated by a lack of sovereignty, a loss of national 
identity, and damage to the living environment. Georgia rather than the USSR has always been 
regarded by the Georgian people as their mother country. The Soviet Union, which was consid-
ered to be a voluntary union of equal republics, was in fact an artificial creation that non-Russian 
nations were forced to join. The majority of Georgians did not therefore claim the USSR as their 
homeland: ‘The USSR was for its nations a socio-political state not a homeland’ [3].
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Non-Russian citizens in the Soviet Union perceived the Russians to be a state-building ‘nation’ 
and the USSR a Russian state. The Soviet authorities, who predicated internationalism on the 
Russian language and new Russian culture, actively combated ethnic nationalism (including 
Russian nationalism, which was associated with chauvinism and a tsarist legacy). Although 
Russkost was considered to be a remnant of a disgraceful past, it was nonetheless used as a tool 
to sovietise society. Indeed, Russian language and culture were both conducive to the assimi-
lation of non-Russians. ‘The Great Russian nation’ was to be ‘the first among equals’ and thus 
Russia provided. Soviet state with certain features of ethnicity. However, Russian characteristics 
were never treated as instrumental to the USSR, because the aim was to form a new socialist, 
national community, that was beyond ethnicity, rather than to convert the citizens of the former 
USSR into Russians. Soviet ideology and science thus set the direction for nationality policy in 
the USSR, especially in terms of forming a Soviet nation.
Based on the foregoing, the present paper identifies how the ethnic character of both the Soviet 
nation and the state.
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1. ETHNICITY AND NATION IN SOVIET 
IDEOLOGY AND SCIENCE
Stalin’s definition of nation has been crucial 
to Soviet theoretical thinking and Soviet policy. 
A nation was understood as an historically con-
stituted, stable community of people formed 
on the basis of a common language, territo-
ry, economic life, and psychological makeup 
manifested in a common culture [4]. The na-
tion was therefore regarded as the highest stage 
of ethnic community development. This view-
point stemmed from the prevailing perception 
of historical processes as a way to achieve 
the next stages of economic development as 
well as the corresponding three-way typology 
of ethnic communities: tribe as representing 
primitive culture nationality as representing 
slavery and feudalism; and nation as represent-
ing a capitalist society (it can be assumed that 
at present its core is the second class).
Capitalist society was to be replaced with by 
a socialist nation, however. The basis of the 
social structure would be ‘an alliance between 
the working class and the working peasants’, 
while a crucial factor for nation-building 
would be the formation of a socialist econo-
my. Socialist paternalism (rather than political 
rights and national culture) would bind the so-
cialist nation. Serfs were thought to be morally 
bound to the state and therefore possessed the 
right to share the social product of the state. 
They were not politically active; nor did they 
feel the ethnic bond; all they were expected to 
do was to be grateful consumers of the goods 
that were chosen and rationed by the state. 
Subjects felt state-dependant, and unlike in 
civil society they did not participate in politi-
cal life nor did they feel ethnic solidarity. The 
socialist nation was rather viewed as a new 
kind of nation, a community beyond ethnicity 
formed mainly by the economic factors that 
would remove the class division and build on 
the mass spatial mobility of its people [5], [6].
Stalin and the Bolshevik party set the direc-
tion for Soviet ethnography, which adopted 
the definition of ethnos that characterised the 
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Stalinist/Bolshevik perception of a nation and 
defined its socio-biological character. Iulian 
Bromlei, an ethnologist considered to be the 
author of the Soviet theory of ethnos, believed 
in a natural origin of ethnic communities, and 
differentiated ‘ethnikos’ from ethno-social or-
ganism. The former meant belonging to an eth-
no-cultural community regardless of place of 
residence, whereas the latter related not only 
to ethnical but also to territorial, political, so-
cial, and finally economic belonging [7], [8].
Nations (nacii), nationalities (narodnosti), 
and nationality groups were distinguished by 
their stage of economic and cultural develop-
ment. This three-way distinction was consist-
ent with the Marxist theory of development but 
ran counter to the ideas of Sergei Shirokogor-
ov, who dismissed the terms of narodnost’ and 
nacional nost as vague and difficult to explain 
[9]. The perception of ethnography above thus 
affected Soviet nationality policy in the form 
of federalism.
2. SOVIET NATIONALITY POLICY
The establishment of the USSR as a union of 
sovereign national republics was inspired by 
Vladimir Lenin. ‘Self-determination from the 
historical and economic point of view is un-
derstood as political self-determination, state 
autonomy, making a national state (...). Just 
like humanity can only get rid of class division 
through a temporary dictatorship of the op-
pressed class, it can only get to the inevitable 
blending of nations by liberating all oppressed 
nations, i.e. freedom of their separation’s [10].
The Bolsheviks, however, rose to power 
in the territory, because the nation-build-
ing processes were poorly developed. Still 
the Declaration of the Rights of the People 
of Russia by the Council of People’s Com-
missars (Sovnarkom) in November 1918 
acknowledged the right of nations to self-de-
termination and autonomy. At the same time, 
all nationalities were expected to unite as one 
Soviet nation based on the Marxist thesis that 
socialism and the bourgeois character of na-
tionalism resulted in nations becoming alike. 
Two concepts of the sliianiia of nations were 
state-building processes and Soviet nationali-
ty policy. The first was represented by Lenin, 
who perceived federalism as a union of auton-
omous national republics. This concept meant 
uniting the Soviet republics of Europe and 
Asia with the already existent Russian FSR. 
Lenin’s idea arose from his fear of the separa-
tist tendencies in Ukraine, Caucasia, and Cen-
tral Asia. His proposal was thus to take into 
account the strive for independence by the na-
tions in the area that would become the USSR 
and their fear of Russian dominance [11].
Another concept envisioned by Stalin was 
the autonomisation of the independent repub-
lics. Stalin called Lenin’s proposal to form the 
USSR liberal nationalism. The proposition 
was submitted to the members of the Politbu-
ro RCP (Bolsheviks) on 26th September 1922. 
This notion moved away from Lenin’s concept 
by proposing sovietisation in a national form: 
“Soviet autonomy is the most real, the most 
concrete form of uniting the outskirts with 
central Russia. No one can deny the fact that 
Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Turkestan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Bashkortostan, Tataria and others cannot do 
without national schools, courts and adminis-
tration, bodies of authority that would all con-
sist mainly of local people. The very reason is 
the outskirts strive for the cultural and materi-
al development of the masses” [12]. 
The new state was to be one economic organ-
ism characterised by formal organs of author-
ity (e.g., Sovnarkom, the All-Russian Central 
Executive Committee); therefore, the Russian 
SFSR now would be the Councils of People’s 
Commissars and the Central Executive Com-
mittees of the independent republics. In this 
way, fictitious independence would be replaced 
by actual autonomy in terms of language, cul-
ture, justice, internal affairs, agriculture and so 
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on. Such autonomy was expected to unite the 
peripheries and the centre in a form of federa-
tion. The essence of this concept was thus the 
formal accession of the Soviet republics to the 
Russian SFSR as autonomous entities.
Lenin proposed replacing the term acces-
sion with ‘formal federation’. In many ways, 
this development represented the establish-
ment of the USSR, namely a compromise 
between Stalinist autonomisation and Lenin’s 
idea of confederation [13]. However, the con-
tradiction between internationalism and the 
ethnic character of the Soviet republics was 
striking. One way forward was granting the 
nations of Russia the right to territorial and na-
tional self-determination. Indeed, the coexist-
ence of the two tendencies of internationalism 
and national identification was characteristic 
of the entirety of USSR history, rendering it 
impossible to categorise the country in terms 
of nation-building processes. Despite their dif-
ferences, Lenin and Stalin both agreed that the 
national factor should be taken into account 
in the state-building process. They were con-
tradicted by high-ranking party officials (e.g., 
Georgy Pyatakov, Nikolai Bukharin) who 
were often internationalists that believed that 
the right to self-determination mobilises coun-
ter-revolutionary (anti-Soviet) forces and thus 
should be reserved for the proletariat only [14].
The union republics that directly formed the 
USSR were sovereign in terms of territory and 
national emblems (e.g., flags, anthems). They 
also had their own republican authorities (par-
liament and government), capital cities and cit-
izenship not to mention a republican commu-
nist party. The ethno-cultural nations that had 
already been established were granted their 
territories, but not the full right to govern them. 
Indeed, they were not recognised as sovereign 
national states for three main reasons. Firstly, 
and most importantly, they did not have politi-
cal sovereignty. Secondly, the republican char-
acter of society was intentionally (though not 
without difficulty) replaced with federal Sovi-
et identity. Finally, the culture dominant in the 
republics was not the national culture of titular 
countries but rather the Soviet one created on 
the basis of post-revolutionary Russian cul-
ture and propagated via the Russian language 
[15]. On the one hand, the union republics 
were the tool of sovietisation that hampered 
the nation-building process. On the other, their 
mere existence, in addition to processes of in-
dustrialisation and urbanisation, made it pos-
sible for nations to consolidate, which led to 
the formation of elites and identification with 
the territory, thus creating the need for autono-
my and sovereignty. Despite their differences, 
Lenin and Stalin both agreed that the nation-
al factor should be taken into account in the 
state-building process. They were contradict-
ed by high-ranking party officials (e.g., Geor-
gy Pyatakov, Nikolai Bukharin) who were of-
ten internationalists that believed that the right 
to self-determination mobilises counter-revo-
lutionary (anti-Soviet) forces and thus should 
be reserved for the proletariat only [14].
With regards to not fully developed eth-
no-cultural nations (e.g., those in Central Asia), 
the existence of federal republics fostered the 
formation of nations based on ‘ethnic material’. 
The Soviet authorities never made it possible 
for USSR nations to form nor to disappear.
 Information about the developmental stage 
of national (ethnic) languages as well as reli-
gions, traditions, customs, ways of farming, 
and descent—tribe structures was collected by 
the ethnographers sent into ethnic territories. 
These data formed the basis for the territorial 
division of Central Asia that was the realisation 
of the state’s national idea. In fact, the nation-
al/territorial division of the region was heavily 
politically influenced. It was the result of ad-
ministrative action (the creation of boundaries, 
territories, institutions), cultural expression 
(language, literature), the effect of scientific 
theories (history, ethnography), and a particu-
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lar vision of social structure (national elites, so-
cial and economic differentiation) [16].
The actions taken by the Soviet authorities 
and science resulted in a significant consol-
idation of Central Asian nations. National 
identity, a, thus far unknown phenomenon 
to local people, was created in the European 
spirit. An interesting notion was removing the 
term ‘Sart’ that was rooted in Central Asia and 
replacing it with the ethnonym ‘Uzbek’. Sarts 
were thought to be a social (ethno-social) cat-
egory associated with the Tajik people rather 
than Uzbek tribes because of their character, 
behaviour, values, resourcefulness, and ap-
pearance. As urban people working in trades, 
administration positions or schools they were 
treated by Bolsheviks as bourgeoisie (unlike 
‘the poor’ Uzbeks that made their living in 
agriculture and breeding). Moreover, having 
been invaded by Turkish tribes, Sarts did not 
fit the image of a socialist nation. Uzbeks had 
more symbols and this allowed scholars to de-
fine them as an ethnic community that had the 
characteristics of a nation. The people of the 
region were provided with national attributes 
(territory considered to be their own, a con-
stitution, state apparatus, literary languages, 
long-standing history, and everyday customs) 
that differentiated nations from one anoth-
er. Two actions were taken to consolidate the 
Kazakh people. The first one was to develop a 
unified culture that was familiar to everyone 
who felt Kazakh and led a nomadic way of life. 
The second one was to clarify that members 
of the Kazakh cultural community have com-
mon origins and history. Census officers were 
instructed in 1926 to register all members of 
Kazakh tribes as Kazakhs. Moreover, the old 
‘pre-national’ terms were changed into new 
‘national’ ones. For instance, agajshylyk, an 
adjective meaning a sense of community be-
tween the descendants of a common ancestor, 
was replaced by qazaqshylyk to refer to all Ka-
zakhs. In this way, the ‘Kazakh nation’ became 
a great tribe whose members felt inter-related. 
This sense of belonging was heightened by tra-
ditional institutions and it raised no objections 
from Kazakhs.
In this way, the European model of a na-
tion was witnessed in the region for the first 
time. Those identity and loyalty criteria that 
had previously dominated were tribe–descent, 
territorial, religious, or state ones, which exist-
ed simultaneously and grew in relative impor-
tance depending on the situation [17]. Hence, 
Soviet ethnography and the ethno-cultural per-
ception of a nation played a crucial role in the 
nation-building process.
The territorial units created on the basis of 
ethnic criteria (Soviet republics, union repub-
lics, autonomous oblasts, and okrugs) repre-
sented the institutionalisation and territoriali-
sation of ethnicity, which in this way became 
dependent on a given territory. This ethnic 
federalism was complemented by personal 
nationality in the guise of the passports (or 
identity cards) introduced in 1932 [18]. Rus-
sian federalism was in fact illusory. The USSR 
was a unitary state in which union republics 
were unequal members of the federation. The 
relations between them and the centre were of 
vertical character. All decisions on the crucial 
interests of each republic had to take into ac-
count the benefit of the entire union. It would 
thus be no exaggeration to define the relations 
between the centre and republics as patron–
client. This provision was enabled by the ex-
istence of union republics and other territorial 
units that were formed according to ethnic cri-
teria. The Kara-Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast, 
which was established as part of the Russian 
SFSR in October 1924, contributed to the 
territorial consolidation of the nation. Three 
factors were involved: i) the fact the Kirghiz 
and Kirghiz people’s native land became unit-
ed within one autonomous oblast (until this 
time they had remained divided between dif-
ferent administrative units of the Turkestan 
Проблемы постсоветского пространства / Post-Soviet Issues
245
Andrzej Wierzbicki, Ethnicity and Power in the Soviet Union
2017 4(3):240-255
ASSR); ii) the establishment of its own system 
of state authority; and iii) the acceleration of 
the transition of traditional patriarchal–feudal 
relations as well as economic and cultural de-
velopment [19].
Although nationality was initially declara-
tive (i.e., a matter of the choice of a particular 
citizen, from 1938 it was defined genealogi-
cally (i.e. dependent on the nationality of par-
ents) and thereby impossible to change except 
where parents were of two different nationali-
ties. To prove this, it was necessary to submit 
documents that could verify the nationality 
of one’s parents [20]. It was then possible to 
choose the nationality of one parent [21].
The USSR thus become characterised by the 
mismatch between national territories and per-
sonal nationality. The vast number of people 
that occupied national territories belonged to 
non-titular nationalities, just as a significant 
proportion of the population lived outside its 
own republics or other national USSR entities.
Soviet nationality policy aimed to consoli-
date nations and accelerate the nation-building 
process. Terry Martin, an American historian, 
points out that the formulation of this policy 
was rooted in four factors. Firstly, national-
ism was treated as an ideology to mobilise 
the masses to unite despite class divisions and 
to fight for national aims. According to both 
Lenin and Stalin, if Soviet authority took a 
national form (i.e., satisfied the demand for 
nationalism to some degree), it would be able 
to defuse national movements and neutralise 
the attractiveness of national slogans, thereby 
creating better conditions to highlight class 
differences and introduce Bolshevism. Sec-
ondly, national identity was considered to be 
an inevitable stage on the journey to interna-
tionalism. Because the future ‘blending’ of na-
tions would only be possible once oppressed 
nations became liberated, the nation-building 
process was perceived as a positive stage of 
socialist modernisation. Thirdly, the Bolshe-
viks were convinced that the nationalism and 
separatism of non-Russians were a reaction 
against the Russian chauvinism of Tsarist au-
thority. In other words, fostering the national 
development of non-Russians, aimed to prove 
that the Soviet authorities would not pursue 
Russian nationalism. Finally, encouraging 
the development of non-Russian nations was 
thought to build a positive image of the Soviet 
Union, raising the number of USSR supporters 
abroad and allowing the Union to have a great-
er influence over neighbouring countries. 
The aims of Soviet nationality policy were 
to nationalise the education system, improve 
state apparatus, and foster a national culture. 
The last goal became known as korenizatsiya. 
3. KORENIZATSIYA
Korenizatsiya (Russian: коренизация) 
aimed to promote the anguage, culture, and 
representatives of a titular nation, especially 
targeting the immigrant populations of the re-
publics. The Soviet authorities concluded that 
such an indigenisation or nativisation program 
would only gain the support of non-Russians if 
it became close to the people and used a famil-
iar native language. To this end, it fostered a 
national education system and recruited local 
people who knew the language, customs, and 
life styles of non-Russians to work in adminis-
trative authorities [22]. A circular letter of the 
Central Committee of the Russian Communist 
Party stated the aims of korenizatsiya in the 
following terms: to strive to place local peo-
ple in state managerial positions; a rule that 
comrades who belong to the local nationality 
and speak local languages would obligatorily 
belong to the presidia of oblast and national 
central committees; to introduce a law that 
every director of the key departments of na-
tional central committees must be a worker of 
the local nationality; and to help the national 
central committees and oblast committees to 
select appropriate local workers. The Orgburo 
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of the RCP (b) Central Committee discussed 
and accepted the plan to put into force na-
tional resolutions, leaving its final review to 
the Central Committee Secretariat. The quot-
ed document excerpt, signed by Jānis Rud-
zutaks, was sent to local party organisations 
[23]. Korenizatsiya, which was pursued until 
the 1930s therefore involved the represent-
atives of titular nations holding positions in 
both the authorities and the enterprises of the 
republics, propagating the national languages 
in the administration, educational system, and 
the press, and promoting the indigenous cul-
ture and customs. However, it did not act to 
deprive Russians or Russian-speaking people 
of party or state-level positions. Korenizatsiya 
was often understood as implementing the lan-
guage of local people. The Central Executive 
Committee and Sovnarkom resolution on the 
korenizatsiya of the Soviet apparatus in the 
Kirghiz ASSR stated that all the decisions of 
the republican and local administration had to 
be given in both Kirghiz and Russian. In addi-
tion, official documentation was to be translat-
ed into Kirghiz or the language spoken by the 
majority of people. Non-Kirghiz officials were 
also obliged to learn Kirghiz [24].
Korenizatsiya progressed relatively quick-
ly. In 1927, for instance, representatives of 
the Soviet authorities corresponded to the 
ethnic structure of many Soviet regions. As 
one example, the rural councils (selsoviets) 
in Ukraine comprised 89% Ukrainians, while 
Ukrainians constituted 85.2% of the rural pop-
ulation. Similarly, Kazakhs, who represented 
59.1 % of the rural population in Kazakhstan, 
comprised 61.2 % of selsoviets. Indeed, the 
advancement of korenizatsiya in urban coun-
cils (gorsoviets) even surpassed the percent-
age of titular people in cities. For instance, 
Kazakhs constituted 222 % of council mem-
bers but only 13.6% of the urban population. 
In Ukraine, these proportions were 42.3% and 
33.4%, respectively. Ukraine was the USSR 
region in which korenizatsiya was most suc-
cessful. In total, 85–90% of the documenta-
tion kept by central institutions in the republic 
were in Ukrainian. From 1924 to 1927, the cir-
culation of newspapers published in Ukrainian 
rose from 90,000 to 612,000 [25]. 
By 1932, however, korenizatsiya had been 
discontinued. It became clear that collectivi-
zisation in non-Russian areas had become un-
successful and a ‘properly conducted national-
ity policy’ had given way to ‘kulak-bourgeois’ 
nationalistic tendencies. At this time, national-
ity policy took the form of russification.
In the 1950 and 1960s, after Stalin’s death 
there was a revival of korenizatsiya, notably 
in Central Asia. Administrative policy in the 
region granted nominal sovereignty to titu-
lar nations, despite retaining central control, 
which led to the consolidation and formation 
of national elites in union republics. Indeed, 
from the 1960s onwards, the second secretary 
of any communist party was always of Rus-
sian or Slavic origin and rarely even resided in 
the republic in question. He unofficially per-
formed the role of the local governor, whose 
duty was to control the nomenclature, while 
the first secretaries of the communist parties 
in the republics were the representatives of the 
titular nations. The number of representatives 
that undertook managerial functions doubled 
and the system prevailed in the state and party 
hierarchy down to the local level. If, for in-
stance, the chairperson of the Supreme Soviet 
was a Kazakh or Uzbek, his first deputy was 
of Russian or other non-titular nationality. The 
same principle applied at the ministerial level, 
where a minister from a titular nation had a 
Russian deputy. The more explicit dominance 
of Russians (Slavs) could be seen in the state 
security service and armed forces. The head of 
republican KGB branches, for example, was 
always of Russian origin and the majority of 
officers were also Slavic while Russians also 
held all key party and state positions. The cen-
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tre distinguished between Russians from the 
Russian SFSR and those from other republics. 
While the former were more trusted than the 
latter, the elites of the republics, considered lo-
cal Russians to have a better understanding of 
local conditions [15].
This period of Korenizatsiya in the 1960s 
was referred to as a patrimonial era. Under the 
rule of, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, the lead-
ers of the union republics in Central Asia were 
relatively independent, as long as the economy 
grew and nationalistic movements remained 
suppressed. During this period, korenizatsiya 
was not directed from Moscow, but was rather 
implemented by the leaders of the republics. 
The party/state apparatus was dominated by 
local people, and concentrated on the leader 
of the same nationality. Patron–client and de-
scent–tribe relationships were thus maintained, 
and the leader and their apparatus fostered na-
tion-building processes in the republics even 
though they officially pursued an antination-
alistic policy.
4. RUSSIFICATION AND SOVIETISATION
The redirection of Soviet nationality policy 
in the first half of the 1930s had a wider con-
text. The ‘export of revolution’ or ‘global rev-
olution’ yielded to Stalin’s concept of ‘social-
ism in one country’ that aimed to fill ‘the new 
civilisation with Russian colours’ [26]. It be-
came apparent that the hitherto ‘positive dis-
crimination’ had not brought about the antic-
ipated results. Indeed, according to the Soviet 
authorities, who were afraid of separatism and 
decentralisation, korenizatsiya had spiralled 
out of control to the point that it now posed 
a threat to unification. The centre strived to 
create a new commonwealth on the grounds 
of Soviet patriotism. The Russian nation and 
‘Russionism’, which had previously been de-
preciated, were now perceived as powerful 
forces for change, able to unite the multina-
tional population of the Soviet state. This about 
turn did not mean, however, that the Bolshevik 
authority aspired to be a Russian (even if a so-
cialistic) national state. It was assumed that, as 
in the tsarist empire, the Russian state would 
unite all other nations, laying the foundations 
to promote Russians and thereby rehabilitating 
both their culture and the Russian SFSR as the 
core of the state.
In December 1935, Soviet propaganda 
adopted a new rhetoric with the slogan, a 
brotherhood of nations, with the Russian na-
tion regarded as the ‘first among equals’ or 
the ‘elderly brother’. ‘Former Russia is now 
converted into the USSR, where the nations 
are equal. The country is strong and powerful 
thanks to its army, industry and collectivised 
agriculture. It is the Russian nation that is 
the most Soviet and revolutionary among the 
equal nations of the Soviet Union.
At the expense of their own national interests, 
Russians had previously helped non-Russians 
overcome their historically justified distrust of 
the Russian identity. The situation, however, 
was now reversed: non-Russians were expect-
ed to express their gratitude for ‘fraternal help’ 
as well as to manifest their ‘love and admira-
tion for the great Russian culture’s.
This unification process comprised three 
stages: (i) expressing solidarity and forming 
amicable relationships with the most progres-
sive Russian working masses; (ii) making the 
Russian culture available to all the nations of 
the Soviet Union to foster their cultural de-
velopment and (iii) establishing the Russian 
language as their means of communication, 
ensuring their economic and cultural advance-
ment [14]. The third factor above was used to 
justify the introduction of obligatory Russian 
in the schools of Soviet republics and national 
territorial units (through the resolution of the 
Central Committee AUCP (B) and Sovnarkom, 
March 13, 1938). A population with a good 
command of Russian was thought to provide 
conditions that were conducive to further sci-
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entific and technological development in ad-
dition to unproblematic military service in the 
Workers and Peasants Red Army and Soviet 
Naval Forces [27]. As the resolution stated, 
‘national language is the basis for teaching in 
the schools of republics and national oblasts… 
and the tendency to transfer the Russian lan-
guage from the subject of teaching into a lan-
guage of instruction equals discrimination on 
the basis of the national language and as such 
is harmful and improper’ [28].
Bolshevik policy became more Russian cen-
trist during the Great Patriotic War. Symbols 
and historical figures familiar to the Russian 
majority were exploited in order to raise pa-
triotic mobilisation among Soviet society in 
‘the search of a usable past’. This term was 
first used in the essay by Henry Steel Com-
mager, The Search for a Usable Past and Oth-
er Essays in Historiography [29]. According 
to the 1939 census, the last before the Third 
Reich’s invasion, Russians constituted 58.4% 
of the country’s population. ‘Russification 
should not be perceived as the ultimate goal 
of indoctrinating non-Russian ethnic groups 
in the spirit of soviet patriotism. The authority 
treated the unprivileged majority of any ethnic 
group, Russians included, in an utilitarian way, 
as ‘human resources’ [30], [31]. Soviet propa-
ganda at the time even compared the leading 
role of the Bolshevik party to the ‘leadership 
of Russians among Soviet nations’.
The actions taken by the Bolshevik authority 
undeniably aimed towards the russification of 
both language and culture. Yet, some Russian 
and Russian-speaking scientists raised con-
cerns about whether the actual goal of Bolshe-
vik nationality policy was the national conver-
sion of non-Russians into Russians. Academics 
do not agree whether national (ethnic) conver-
sion is at all possible. Antonina Kłoskowska 
has pointed out that national identity can be 
changed by a new sense of cultural belonging 
but that this does not imply being absorbed 
by another culture. Sergey Abashin, a Rus-
sian anthropologist, has stressed that there is 
no single answer to the question of whether 
one’s ethnicity (nationality) can be changed. 
He suggests that ethnicity is regarded as some-
thing given, that cannot be affected, whether 
we take the constructivist or primordialist 
point of view [32], [33]. Such concerns were 
generally refuted, however, given that even if 
non-Russians started to identify with russian-
ism in the long run, this process was treated 
instrumentally as a platform to sovietisation, 
or the formation of an international Soviet na-
tion. ‘It is a matter of fact that all the elements 
of a nation — the language, territory, common 
culture — did not fall from the sky but were 
gradually shaped, even in the pre-capitalist era. 
However, those elements were only a nucleus 
and at best formed a potential basis for a na-
tion’s future development in certain favoura-
ble conditions’ [4].
Indeed, such assimilation was impossible 
for at least three reasons. First, the Stalinist 
concept of a nation included a primordialist 
argument about ‘the rooting of nations’ and 
ethno-cultural kinship, which is subject to nat-
ural inheritance rather than free choice. Cul-
tural symbols such as language and customs 
were perceived to be determinants of biolog-
ical consanguinity and nationality defined on 
the grounds of genealogy, not residence or lan-
guage only. Primordialism, in fact, excludes 
the possibility of changing one’s nationality. 
Bolshevik primordialism notably refers to 
modern ethnosymbolism, namely a conviction 
about the ethnic roots of nations. Second ‘the 
rooting of nations’ made Bolsheviks believe 
in the permanence of nations and their mother 
tongues as well as their resistance to assimi-
lation reinforcing their ethno-cultural basis. 
Finally, language and cultural assimilation 
does not necessarily mean the full conversion 
of national identity. Even today, a vast number 
of Belarusian, Ukrainian, and Kazakh citizens 
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are Russian-speaking Belarusians, Ukraini-
ans, and Kazakhs. Belarusian and Ukrainian 
(non-Galician) city residents were practically 
the same as Russians in terms of culture; they 
spoke and still speak Russian, know little or 
no Belarusian and Ukrainian literary languag-
es but are fully aware of their Belarusian or 
Ukrainian identity and their national languag-
es are Belarusian and Ukrainian. This is anoth-
er example of how Soviet nationality policy 
did not allow the nation-making process to be 
complete [31]. Shala qazaq (‘half Kazakh’) is 
an especially interesting phenomenon. Shala 
qazaq was a large Russian-speaking Kazakh 
population different from traditional Kazakhs 
(nagyz qazaq). Broadly speaking, Shala qazaq 
are russified Kazakhs. The russification of Ka-
zakhs concerned not only their language but 
also their identity and culture. This started to 
replace their communal character and clan-
nishness with individualism and developed 
a consumer way of life. Shala qazaq are per-
ceived as a temporary subethnos between tra-
ditional Kazakhs and Russians, a distinction 
that complicates modern ethnic relations in 
Kazakhstan.
Process of migration, specially of Russian 
and other eastern Slavic nations (i.e., demo-
graphic russification) played a substantial 
role in consolidating a Russian component 
in the Soviet state. In the early 1920s, Rus-
sians were forbidden from settling in some 
non-Russian territories of the USSR. Russian 
settlers from the tsarist era were exiled as il-
legal immigrants. Later, the policy was aban-
doned. Soviet migration policy, just as in the 
Russian Empire, had political, economic and, 
crucially for the present paper, cultural aims. 
Its core was the unification of Soviet nations 
on the grounds of Soviet ideology and Russian 
culture, and the conversion of the Soviet na-
tions into a homogeneous, classless ethno-so-
cial conglomerate. This policy referred to ‘the 
system of ethnographic actions’ from Tsarist 
Russia that aimed to foster the russification 
of the empire’s peripheries through the settle-
ment of Russian peasants [15]. The migration 
of Russians in the Soviet Union, just as the de-
velopment of fallow land in the Kazakh SSR 
in the 1950s, was chiefly urban-led turning 
the cities of the republics into Euro-Russian 
cultural centres, whereas the countryside pre-
served its local ethnic character. Towards the 
time of the breakup of the USSR, over 25 mil-
lion Russians lived in the Russian SFSR, rep-
resenting 17.4% of the USSR population. The 
most populous Russian concentration outside 
the Russian SFSR (compared with the nation’s 
population in the USSR) was in the Ukrainian 
and Kazakh SSRs while the highest propor-
tion of Russians was in the Kazakh, Latvian, 
Estonian, Ukrainian, and Kirgiz SSRs. Indeed, 
according to the 1979 census, there were more 
Russians than Kazakhs (the titular nation) in 
the Kazakh SSR.
Table 1. Russians in the ethnic structure of the USSR and union republics in 1989
Territory
Overall 
population (m)
Russians in the ethnic struc-
ture of the republic
% of Rus-
sians in the 
USSR
% of Rus-
sians Out-
side the 
Russian 
SFSR
m %
Armenian SSR 3,304,776 51,555 1.6 0.1 0.2
Azerbaijan SSR 7,021,178 392,304 5.6 0.3 1.6
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Belarusian SSR 10,151,806 1,342,099 13.2 0.9 5.3
Estonian SSR 1,565,662 474,834 30.3 0.4 1.9
Georgian SSR 5,400,841 341,172 6.3 0.2 1.3
Kazakh SSR 16,464,464 6,227,549 37.8 4.3 24.6
Kirghiz SSR 4,257,755 916,558 21.5 0.6 3.6
Lithuanian SSR 3,674,802 344,455 9.4 0.2 1.4
Latvian SSR 2,666,567 905,515 34.0 0.6 3.6
Moldavian SSR 4,335,360 562,069 13.0 0.4 2.2
Russian SFSR 147,021,869 119,865,946 81.5 82.6 -
Tajik SSR 5,092,603 388,481 7.6 0.3 1.6
Turkmen SSR 3,522,717 333,892 9.5 0.2 1.3
Ukrainian SSR 51,452,034 11,355,582 22.1 7.8 44.9
Uzbek SSR 19,810,077 1,653,478 8.3 1.1 6.5
USSR 285,742,511 145,155,489 - 100 -
Rabochij arhiv Goskomstata Rossii. Tablitsa 9c. Raspredelenie naseleniia po natsional’nosti i rodnomu 
iazyku, www.demoscope.ru (13th November 2012).
Sovietisation had therefore selective eth-
no-Russian grounds, devoid of Orthodox 
Christianity and related cultural aspects 
(music, singing, iconography, etc.). Despite 
unification tendencies, a relatively strong 
non-Russian ethnicity remained in certain re-
publics. This ethno-Russian basis of the Soviet 
state was heightened by the conviction about 
the Russian sources of the collectivisation 
of agriculture and Soviet congresses. Sergey 
Kara-Murza advanced a thesis that the Sovi-
et regime was based on agrarian community 
communism (peasant community; obshchina, 
mir) that fostered the collectivisation of ag-
riculture and other reforms by the Bolshevik 
authorities but Richard Pipes pointed out that 
the lack of private property was common for 
both mir and kolhoz. The first, however, was 
not collective and farming was carried out on-
private land. Moreover, the peasants living in 
mir were the owners of their harvest, where-
as kolhoz production belonged to the country 
[34]. According to Kara-Murza, this reason 
explains why the Soviet authorities, for the 
first time, achieved considerable success in its 
state modernisation. All previous reformatory 
and modernisation projects had been almost 
bound to fail because they did not take into 
account Russian traditions [35], [36].
Nonetheless, taking into account the way 
collectivisation progressed and the approval it 
met with, resistance was lower in central Rus-
sia, which had traditions of communal agricul-
ture, than it was in Ukraine.
The chairperson of the Supreme Soviet of 
the USSR Anatoly Lukyanov stated in 1989 
that ‘the Soviet congress is a unique phenom-
enon, whose idea comes from Russian “sobor-
ness”’. There is, in fact, an analogy between 
the Soviet congresses or the congresses of 
people’s deputies of the late USSR and Zem-
sky Sobors. Neither the Soviet congresses 
nor those of the people’s deputies laid down 
the law but they did decide on changes to the 
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constitution, thereby setting the direction for 
domestic or foreign policy Zemsky Sobors 
expressed public opinion on Muscovy and the 
monarch would take this into account at cru-
cial moments for the state. An assembly of the 
Russian Empire (1613 Zemsky Sobor) elect-
ed Mikhail Romanov to be the Tsar of Russia. 
The Zemsky Sobor, which roughly means the 
assembly of the land, was an assembly of all 
the states of Russia. It gathered, in a way, the 
whole country as one land (territory).
Both russification and sovietisation (collec-
tivisation) intensified in the early 1930s while 
Stalinist repression against the activists of pre-
viously korenised state-party apparatus also 
increased. They were accused of ‘bourgeois 
nationalism’ and membership of counterrev-
olutionary political organisations and the re-
pressions were mainly aimed at the national 
elite, with party purges resulting in the change 
of staff in state bodies [37].
Transforming the people of the USSR into 
consolidated nations was intended to spread 
communist propaganda, erode the category of 
a nation, and establish a national Soviet com-
munity. Internationalisation was to be preced-
ed by nationaliisation (ethnicisation); howev-
er, the construction of the Soviet nation had 
a number of stages, two of which were cru-
cial. The first concerned the consolidation of 
nations whose nation-building processes were 
in a preliminary stage (or only in the planning 
stage in the case of ethnic communities). The 
second aimed to convert the multinational 
population into a new historical community, 
the Soviet nation.
5. THE SOVIET NATION AS A NEW 
HISTORICAL COMMUNITY
One leading Bolshevik activist Mikhail Ka-
linin wrote in 1927 that ‘we as a state should 
make the entire population Soviet, saturate it 
with Soviet patriotism’. That year he optimis-
tically wrote (using the example of the North 
Caucasus) about the supposedly already exist-
ent Soviet identity: ‘ Now, that the Chechen 
people have been given their autonomy it is 
their responsibility to care about the well-be-
ing and development of the country. At once 
they have felt full right citizens of not only 
their little Chechnya but also the entire Union’ 
[38]. A number of years later, he added: ‘ At 
our place, in the USSR, a Russian man is not 
being shaped but rather a new type of a man 
[is emerging] — a Soviet citizen’. Hence, the 
image of a nation characterised by Soviet citi-
zenship and a peculiar patriotism was already 
present at the beginning of the 1930s.
Nikolai Bukharin, another prominent Bol-
shevik revolutionary, pointed out that the 
consolidation of the Soviet nation was both 
vertical (class-stratified) and horizontal (na-
tional). ‘There has come a great union of all 
classes and nations in a multinational nation, 
a common mother country which is the USSR’ 
[20]. The basis of this consolidation was an 
alliance between the working class, peasants, 
and international intelligentsia: ‘That is how 
the union is built (...) by tighter and tighter 
unity between the working people of differ-
ent nations: the unity of purpose, the unity of 
direction, the unity of economic planning, the 
colossal increase of new, real relationships — 
economic and cultural ones. All of these lead 
to an extraordinary union of nations, develop-
ing their own (national in form) and common 
(socialist in content) culture’ [20].
However, the prerevolutionary division of 
nations was problematic for the Soviet na-
tion-building process. The Bolsheviks divided 
nations into industrialised and agrarian (ac-
cording to socio-economic criteria) and more 
and less culturally developed (according to 
cultural conditions). This classification cre-
ated a hierarchy of nations with Russia at the 
apex (a community that already had a well-
shaped culture) together with Belarusians, 
Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, Jews and 
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‘western national minorities’ such as Poles, 
Germans and Finns). At the bottom of the 
hierarchy, nations at a lower level of cultural 
development included, those in Central Asia, 
Bashkirians, Buryats and Mongols, the Komi 
and Mari people, Kalmyks and the nations of 
the Caucasus and the North. Andrei Bubnov, 
the People’s Commissar for Education, stated 
in 1935 that ‘one of the major achievements of 
the October Revolution was the development 
of literature for the nations of the North’. It 
concerned at the time 12 nationalities of the 
area (the Sami people, the Nenets, the Khan-
ty people, the Mansi people, the Evenks, the 
Chukchi people, Eskimos, Koryaks, the Evens, 
the Nanai people, the Nivkh people, the Ude-
ge people) [39]. Counteracting analphabetism, 
the development of educational and healthcare 
systems was part of a cultural revolution. In-
deed, the main objective for some nations was 
to establish literary language and activity.
One of the crucial aims of Soviet nationali-
ty policy was to equalise the economic devel-
opment of nations through industrialisation 
which in the 1930s began to be run on a large 
scale and aimed to end the division between 
industrialised and agricultural nations. The 
division of production across the USSR terri-
tory resulted from state-level priorities, how-
ever. In particular, the geographical locations 
of enterprises depended on centralised plans 
of development that took into account the nat-
ural and climatic conditions, availability of 
production factors (resources, qualified work-
ers), local traditions, and military and strategic 
characteristics. As a result, each republic had 
its own specialisation.
Further, even though all Soviet nations were 
equal constitutionally, titular nations were 
privileged compared with those that did not 
have their own national territories (i.e., na-
tions that had only individual nationality). The 
national elites in titular republics and other 
national USSR entities were especially afraid 
that the new socialist nation would be formed 
from the de-ethnicisation of nations (e.g., by 
removing nationality data from passports, 
while establishing inter-republican organs of 
authority). For this reason, the official word-
ing multinational Soviet nation (emphasised 
in the Central Committee report for the 13th 
Party Congress held in 1966) was welcomed 
with some relief.
In the 1970s, Leonid Brezhnev, the General 
Secretary of the CC CPSU spoke at the 24th 
and 25th Party Congresses about a would-be 
historical community in a rather vague man-
ner. A precise explanation of what the new 
community was supposed to be was published 
by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in 1972 
and 1974: ‘The Soviet nation is not some new 
nation but an historical community of people 
that is much more than a nation, as it covers 
all USSR nations. The ‘Soviet nation’ is a term 
that reflects a thorough change of the nature 
and character of Soviet nations. It expresses 
how close and international they have become. 
Still, all socialist nations form one soviet na-
tion, being at the same time its national com-
ponents [40].
CONCLUSION
Although the formation of the Soviet nation 
was incomplete, the marks of Soviet identity 
remained not only in Russia but also in Be-
larus, eastern Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. Ac-
cording to Valery Tishkov, a Russian anthro-
pologist, the Soviet nation was a civil and 
socio-cultural community. The mentality and 
everyday culture (‘the USSR is my home-
land’) present throughout the USSR’s exist-
ence prove this opinion [41]. The population 
of the USSR undoubtedly felt united in terms 
of culture and citizenship but not in regards to 
territory. Apart from Russians, all other titular 
nations identified primarily with their own re-
publics rather than with the entire Soviet Un-
ion. Indeed, despite its efforts, the USSR never 
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became the national state of the Soviet nation 
nor even the Russian national state. The exact 
criteria of the way the union republics were 
established remain unknown. Andrei Sud’in 
suggested the rule was that the union repub-
lics were formed on the external borders of the 
USSR. This reasoning explains why the Ta-
tars, for example, whose territory did not have 
such borders, were never given the status o f 
a union republic, even though they previously 
had their own state. The argument seems to be 
inadequate, however, since the Kazakhs and 
Kyrgyz, who had such borders, did not gain 
the status of a union republic until 1936 [42].
The key position of Russians was undenia-
ble, and the use of the Russian language was 
common place in all the Soviet nations. How-
ever, the USSR did not have the features of 
a national state (federalism, personal identity, 
the development of non-Russian elites and 
national cadres, educational system, and cul-
ture), while the living standards and living 
conditions were higher in many union repub-
lics than in Russia or Russian SFSR. The only 
appropriate term for the USSR would be a 
multinational state or the term used by Amer-
ican authors, a state of nations [43]. It is also 
unquestionable that the reinforcement of the 
Russian ethnic element in the state-building 
process as well as the support of non-Russian 
development were both used as tool to create 
a synthesis of constructivism and ethnosym-
bolism. The basis of soviet constructivism was 
territorial-state centrism (union republics as 
“sovereign” political organisms), which gave 
the nations that had their own territories priori-
ty over self-development. Constructivism also 
derived from ethnosymbolism, because the 
nations-building process was an ethnic-based 
phenomenon.
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